Monday 30 April 2018

Zevachim 17: Does a Mitzvah Done While Ritually Impure Count as a Mitzvah?

Some thoughts from today's daf:

  • A person who is tamei, in a state of ritual impurity, cannot participate in a number of rituals
  • If a person who is ritually impure does participate in Temple rituals, their service is invalidated 
  • A similar question: must a man go to the mikvah, the ritual bath, every morning before reciting his prayers?  
  • What if a man had a seminal emission during the night?  
  • Will his prayers be nullified if he does not pour at least 9 day of water on himself? 
  • The Jerusalem Talmud says that it is permitted to bathe and to engage in marital relations
  • how could it be that someone who is ritually impure would bring a sacrifice/engage in prayers?  
  • The rabbis argue that the Jerusalem rabbis were lenient
  • More people should have been strict about going to the mikvah before prayers/service in the Temple
  • Before every prayer people should go to the mikvah
The notion that prayer is a direct substitution for Temple rituals is challenging.  Bringing a sacrificial offering is so visceral, such a limited action within time and space. It is externally focused and measurable. Prayer, on the other hand, is long-lasting, internally focused, and extremely difficult to measure.  How can we expect people to adhere to the halachot of prayers when we had difficulty with the 'simpler' rites of offerings in the Temple?

Sunday 29 April 2018

Zevachim 16: Impure or Blemished; Performing Ritual Rites

The rabbis discuss the implications of a priest who is impure continuing to perform the sacrificial rites.  They consider a number of factors including whether priests are similar to common people when and how the can practice sacrifice.  What counts as 'desecration' in public altars and in Temple sacrifices.  The acute mourner, whether a priest or someone else, is prohibited from performing sacrificial rites.

In amud (b), the rabbis confirm that there are differences by tribe and by state of acute mourning.  The Gemara identifies the one limitation on the actions of a blemished priest.  That is the priest's ability to impart ritual impurity upon others through touch.  An ordinary priest who is blemished is permitted to perform a communal offering.


Zevachim 15: Who is Unfit?

The rabbis continue to discuss their thought about when an offering or the blood from the slaughtered and is brought with an intention that disqualifies the offering from sacrifice.  Part of today's daf brings us to our next Mishna, which teaches:

  • if a non-priest collected the sacrifice's blood
  • of if  priest who was an occur corner (one who's loved one is not yet buried)
  • one who is ritually impure - has immersed but is waiting for night
  • one who has not yet brought an atonement offering, a zav or leper after seven days of purification,
  • a priest without his special clothing
  • one who did not wash hands and feet in water in the basin before performing the Temple service, 
  • an uncircumcised priest
  • a ritually impure priest
  • or if the one who collected blood is sitting or standing on vessels of the temple - or on animals or on another person's feet
In all of these cases, the offering is deemed to be unfit.

The Gemara tells us that a priest who is no qualified to collect or give the sacrifice is 'kosher' by calling on the story earlier in the Torah narrative when we read, "Speak to Aaron and to his sons, that they separate themselves from the sacred items of the children of Israel” (Leviticus 22:2). The rabbi suggest who is meant to be excluded through this verse.  Who is included when we speak of some people removing themselves?  Impure priests? Women and children? Gentiles? Those with blemishes?


Today was just Shabbat Itanu, a shabbat that celebrates inclusion.  Very telling that today's daf focused on how we decide who should be excluded.  

Thursday 26 April 2018

Zevachim 13: Focus During the Four Rites of Slaughter

We begin with a new Mishna which speaks to the paschal offering and the sin offering.  It teaches that the following offerings are unfit: 
  • when they are slaughtered not for their own sake 
  • where their blood was collected in a vessel, brought to the altar
  • where they sprinkled this blood on the altar not for their sake
  • where they performed the sacrificial rites for their sake or not
If one slaughters the paschal offering for the sake of a peace offering as well as a peace offering.  A slaughtered offering is disqualified due to forbidden intent in four ways:
  • performing the sacrificial rites of slaughter
  • collecting the blood
  • carrying the blood
  • sprinkling the blood
Rabbi Shimon argues that the offering is fit if the forbidden intent was during the rite of carrying the blood, or without sprinkling the blood.  How is it possible to sacrifice an offering without collecting the blood or without bringing the blood to the altar?  The answer is that if the animal is slaughtered beside the altar, the blood can be sprinkled without being carried.  

Rabbi Eliezer argues that one who brings the blood in a situation where it has to be carried, prohibited intent while carrying it disqualifies the offering.  If one carries the blood when it is not required to carry it, prohibited intent while carrying the blood will not disqualify it.

The Gemara chronicles the rabbis' conversations about how similar considerations might be applied to other parts of the sacrificial rites.  An example is used regarding one who walks to a synagogue far from home, one is rewarded.  At the very least, we are rewarded once we reach that destination.  

This notion of 'intent' suggests that we are meant to be in control of our thoughts, not just our actions, when going through the process of bringing an offering.  It is a tall order to insist that people think about one thing only when they are apologizing, but perhaps that is what is suggested.  If sacrifice is a form of atonement, and it was replaced by prayer, should we believe that we are intended to focus our minds upon our prayer, particularly when we are asking for atonement?  Would G-d not hear our prayer - disqualify our offering - if we are not thinking about a prescribed ritual of asking for atonement?

Wednesday 25 April 2018

Zevachim 12: Half of a Consecrated Animal?

The rabbis continue to sort out the conundrum they have encountered regarding the timing of the paschal offering.  So much has been learned about this particular offering that the rabbis find statements/instructions that contradict each other.  

We are told that an animal that is owned by one person can only be consecrated in whole; if one half of the animal is consecrated, the other half is automatically consecrated as well.  An animal owned by two partners is a different case.  One is only permitted to consecrate his/her part of an animal owned by two partners. 

In such a case, both partners must consecrate the animal in order for it to be fully fit as an offering.  If this doesn't happen, the rabbis agree that an animal disqualified is permanently disqualified, and that an animal half consecrated becomes fully consecrated but not fit for sacrifice if one owner buys the second half of the animal after the first consecration.  Timing is almost everything, it seems.  

The rabbis compare different transgressions and their offerings.  Which pairs have something in common?  At the end of a long discussion, we learn that the dispute that initiated this conversation might have been reviewed as an exercise for students.



Zevachim 11: Timing; OCD

We begin by discussing whether or not the pascal lamb is permitted if it was not brought at the right time.  It might be valid because it is like another offering that was kosher even though it was brought at the wrong time.  Another argument is that the pascal lamb must be offered at a very specific time to be permitted.  We continue to think about what is permitted and what is not permitted before the official start of Pesach.  

Is the daily afternoon offering in the afternoon allowed to be offered any time during the day as well?  This is successfully challenged, again by considering other practices that might be dependent on a particular period of time - an example is the menorah, where the lighting actually lasts for the day.  

The Jewish tendency toward obsessive compulsive behaviour has a long history.  The details that are discussed and debated are considered to be of great significance.  Is it possible that the most desirable Jews were those who could obsess and remember these details?  Did we breed OCD into ourselves?  

Monday 23 April 2018

Zevachim 10: Rabbi Yochanan, Reish Lakish and Pigul/Sprinkling Blood as Proofs

If a person thinks about throwing the blood on the altar while he is slaughtering, is the sacrifice valid?  Rabbi Yochanan says that it is invalid because if one thinks about a different process while doing one process, we learn from pigul that it is invalid.  Pigul states that if in any of the four processes (slaughter, collecting blood, carrying blood, sprinkling blood).  

Reish Lakish says that even in this case, the sacrifice is kosher.  He suggests that the case of pigul refers to when the offering can be eaten.  Thus we cannot use pigul as a proof text.  Further, he argues that if while slaughtering an animal one thinks about idolatry, then of course the offering is invalid. 

One argument is that we should be permitted to use arguments regarding sprinkling the blood as proof texts for imperfect slaughter.  But we learn that pigul happens inside the sanctuary while these processes happen outside.  And how could the slaughter be valid? This person we refer to must be an idolater.  The rabbis teach that if a person is evil on one occasion, that is not enough to invalidate his slaughter.  Also, an act of evil is one done consciously and out of spite.  If a person thinks of idolatry spitefully while slaughtering an offering, his/her offering is agreed to be invalid.

Sunday 22 April 2018

Zevachim 9: Can We Be Lenient About Offerings? Halacha as Metaphor

We begin today's daf with a conversation that sheds light on the larger picture behind these endless details.  The rabbis wonder why we would not count an offering as the offering it was intended to be. The rabbis are aware of the leniencies that would overcome so much of Jewish thought: can we assume that halacha should be used as metaphor?

As soon as we explore what was done in the Temple, we can assume that there were cases that fell in between the broad laws that existed at the time.  To solve those problems, the rabbis looked to similar cases, to similar words used at other times, to any hint that they could find.  And in the end, many of those cases are called "unresolved" in the Talmud.  We are encouraged to study not just the halacha, but the arguments that precede - or replace - halacha.  

And so how do we know what to do when the halacha does not apply to a given situation?  And, to be clear, almost all cases have little to do with halacha.  This entire masechet, for example is dedicated to a particular type of offering in the Temple.  Even when the rabbis had these conversations, the Temple had been destroyed.  Beyond rebuilding the Temple and reasserting these halachot, these practices do not apply to us.  Yet we must learn them.   Why?  Are they teaching us how to question and how to think?  Or are they teaching us how to behave according to metaphor?

For example, there are different 'types' of people, and each should bring different offerings for different purposes.  As metaphor, this suggests that we should be thinking about how we are different and how our offerings of apology or thanksgiving should hold meaning for each of us differently.




Saturday 21 April 2018

Zevachim 8: Offering Fit for Sacrifice

The Gemara discusses the sin offerings and whether or not it must be done for its own sake.  The rabbis then find proof texts to justify why a sin offering offered not for its own sake is not valid.  Offerings brought for one who is a nazirite, or for one who is ending their seclusion for having za'arat, a specific skin condition - are considered.  Many rabbis believe that we cannot compare these different categories of offerings.

We are are introduced to a baraita regarding a different offering brought for its own sake - or no.  It states that a korban Pesach, a paschal offering, that is slaughtered at the proper time - erev Pesach - is fully kosher as long as it was slaughtered for its own sake.  If not, it is not fit for sacrifice.

Friday 20 April 2018

Zevachim 6: What Atones for What?

Some very brief points from today's daf:
  • The rabbis discuss whether and how one or more heirs might inherit the paschal offering
  • The rabbis discuss whether or not an offering atones for its owner if the offering is given for a reason other than for its own sake
  • The rabbis consider what a pascal offering atones for and what is not included in its atonement 

Wednesday 18 April 2018

Zevachim 5: An Offering After the Death of an Owner

We are told that Reish Lakish argues from the floor while lying on his stomach.  The rabbis believe that Reish Lakish was using his "stomach as [his] pillow", as he explained to his daughter in Masechet Gittin.  This practice would be following the guidelines suggested in Masechet Avot: Eat bread dipped in salt, drink water in measure, sleep on the floor, have a life of travail, and toil in Torah.  

The rabbis discuss differences between vow offerings, gift offerings and guilt offerings.  They also consider burnt offerings.  Their comparisons include whether or not offerings are brought after the owner's death. This is one of the factors that distinguishes one type of offering from another.

At the end of today's daf, the rabbis consider whether one person might atone for another after the death of the owner.  They look at a woman who brings an offering after childbirth and then dies; a woman who has committed a number of sexual transgressions who has atoned.  They also consider an owner's children after the owner had died.   


Tuesday 17 April 2018

Zevachim 4: Responsible for Our Own Offerings/Apologies

Some very basic notes from today's daf:
  • the guidelines for zevachim, sacrifices are compared with those for shechita, non-ritual slaughter
  • a korban, paschal sacrifice, is offered for the sake of those who will eat it
  • slaughter can be performed by any Jew, but the collection of blood cannot be performed by a non-priest or by a woman
  • sprinkling of blood and collection of blood is done for the sake of the shelamim, peace offering
  • sprinkling the blood by a non-priest or woman is punishable by death at the hand of heaven
  • a toda shelemav, thanksgiving peace offering, is eaten on the day it was offered for the sake of the owner
  • zevachim should not be separated from other sacrificial rites
  • an intent to deviate one's intent from the owner to anyone else makes one liable
  • the rabbis state clearly that one is responsible for their own sacrifices
  • "shall offer" is a generalization followed by "a sacrifice" is a detail; hermeneutics teach that a generalization followed by a detail includes only the detail in the generalization and thus a zevach is performed for the sake of its owner but no other rite is performed for the sake of its owner in order that the sacrifice is fit
  • shelamim = peace offering; all peace offerings
  • shelamav = his peace offering
  • nedava = gift offering
  • neder = vow offering
One of the major themes in today's daf is the obligation for one to know that a sacrifice is made for one's own sake. We are each of us responsible for our own transgressions and for making things right. As we no longer have the Temple to guide our acts of asking forgiveness, we must find other ways to "offer" our apologies. It is up to me, and no one else, to carry my own offerings and to ask for forgiveness when I make mistakes.

Monday 16 April 2018

Zevachim 3: Offering With Improper Intent

Some of the main points from today's daf include:
  • the rabbis' conversations regarding the specificity within a get, both regarding the names on the get and whether the get explicitly indicates that a wife is free to marry another man
  • the rabbis' conversations about improper intent regarding a sin offering, where it seems to be understood that an offering about something completely unrelated is considered to be with no intent at all. The act of offering without improper intent is compared to the transmission (or not) of ritual impurity when a ceramic vessel holds susceptible items and also a second vessel within.
  • the rabbis' conversations about intent for a different offering or for a different owner, where proofs are offered for the idea that intent for something unrelated is considered to be not improper intent, but intent for something related is considered to be improper intent

Sunday 15 April 2018

Zevachim 2: Offerings that are Permitted, Levels of Holiness

Our first Mishna teaches a number of points:

  • any animal offering that was slaughtered as if it were a different offering or with the intent to throw its blood on the altar is kosher but the owner is not excused from his obligation
  • the pascal offering and the sin offering are exceptions
  • Rabbi Eliezer says that asham, reparation offerings, are excepted as well/ they are (patul, not unfit)
  • Yosi ben Choni says that an animal offering that was slaughtered to be a pesach offering for a sin offering is permitted
  • Shimon Ach Azaryah says that any animal offering that was slaughtered to G-d  and was of higher holiness is kosher; one who slaughtered to G-d an animal offering of a lower degree of holiness is patul, not unfit
  • An example is provided: kodashim kalim, offerings of lower sanctity, are known because they are designated to be eaten by anyone, even Yisraelim - in Jerusalem usually for two days and a night, as opposed to those that may be eaten only by a male priest within one day
  • if a first-born offering is slaughtered, it is kosher
  • if a gift offering is slaughtered in the name of the first-born, it is patul, not unfit
The Gemara, of course, takes issue with each point of this new Mishna.  
  • Why does the Mishna mention that the owner was not excused from his obligation?
  • Among their answers, the rabbis note that we can learn the answer from either reasoning or from a verse
  • Stam, something written or decided according to halacha, and lishma, something performed for its own sake, are compared
  • There are six intentions when one offers an animal offering:
    • which korban it is (Olah, etc.)
    • for whom it atones
    • that it is offered to G-d
    • the animal fats (and the limbs if the offering is an blah) will be burned (and consumed, not roasted) on the altar
    • it should be a pleasant aroma (the meat will be roasted only when it is put on the altar and not before)
    • it should be pleasing to G-d
  • The rabbis ask how Rava knows that a get written with an editor is not unfit
  • If one overheard a scribe reciting the text of the get while writing it, he cannot divorce his wife with that document
  • The scribe had not intended that that document be used for the purposes of divorce, and thus it should not be permitted

Saturday 14 April 2018

Horayot 14: Is it Better to be "Sinai" and Know the Foundation or to "Move Mountains" Through Critique?

In our last daf of Masechet Horayot, we continue to learn about rabbinic leaders and their responsibilities.  In yesterday's daf, we were told the story of Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel who was Nasi of the Sanhedrin when Rabbi Meir was the great Chacham, Wise One, and Rabbi Natan was the father of the beit din, the Av Beit Din.  Instead of continuing the practice of all students rising for all three leaders, Rabbi Shimon enacted a baraita that called for those in the row of the Chacham to stand and for those within four amot of the Av Beit Din to rise and then sit as he passed.  This was done when Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Natan were away.  

Rabbis Meir and Natan conspired to demonstrate their superior knowledge by asking Rabbi Shimon to teach a lesser known mishna.  Rabbi Shimon heard a student recite that teaching and memorized it; he then banished the other two leaders.  Because they were still called upon to answer difficult questions, they were returned to the beit din.  However, Rabbi Meir's teachings were recorded as "Some say" and Rabbi Natan's teachings were named, "Others say".  

We are introduced to a conversation between Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel and his father, also called "Rebbi".  Do we have to punish wise leaders for their attempt to uproot the Nasi in the past?  We learn expressions including "what was, was" and "the enemy died, but his swords persist for all time".  Rabbi Shimon notes that Rabbis Meir and Natan did not succeed in their attempts.  

The Gemara's final conversation is shared by Rabbi Yochanan.  Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel and the Chachamim, wise Sages, argued about whether it is preferable to be Sinai, one who knows the mishnayot and beraitot as if they were heard on Sinai, or one who can uproot mountains - argue and win against traditionally held views through fine reasoning skills.  Rav Yosef is described as Sinai and Rabbah is said to have uprooted mountains.

The Sages believe that Sinai is more important.  Like wheat forms many foods, mishnayot and beraitot create all halacha.  But Rav Yosef waited for Rabbah to die before he became Nasi.  Clearly he believed that it was more important to critique and create new halacha.

An aside - Rav Yosef is said to have needed no doctor in those 22 years - a bloodletter never entered his home.  This was thought to be a reward for his humility.

After the death of Rav Yosef, the role of Nasi could have gone to Abaye, Rava, or Rabbi Zeira.  Rabbah bar Masnah made the decision about the next Nasi.  He decided that the rabbi who shared an irrefutable teaching would be Nasi.  Abaye's teaching was not refuted, and so he became Nasi.

The Gemara asks who took precedence, Rabbi Zeira or Rabbah bar Masna.  The question is left unanswered: Rabbi Zeira is said to have asked sharp questions.  Rabbah bar Masna would deliberate and make conclusions based on the halacha.  Thus Rabbi Zeira was Sinai and Rabbah bar Masnah moved mountains.

The fact that this unanswered question ends our mishna leads me to believe that the rabbis agree that both are important.  We must be rooted in the foundational texts and teachings.  Concurrently we are encouraged to question and critique in order to become the people that G-d envisioned us to be.

Thursday 12 April 2018

Horayot 12: Anointing Oil Practices, Kohen Gadol Vs. Kohen

Some points from today's daf:

  • The anointing oil, specially prepared to be saved until the end of days, is said to be lost along with the aron kodesh, the holy ark
  • King Yoshiahu is said to have hidden sacred items, believing that the Jews would be exiled in his time (end of the first Temple)
  • The rabbis discuss how high priests and kings were anointed with oil: first the head and then between the eyebrows? is it alright to have droplets on the beard? etc.
  • The rabbis understand that kings were permitted to be anointed along with high priests because "no other man" may be anointed - kings are not just men
  • the rabbis discuss where one should be anointed
  • the rabbis discuss a number of issues that affect only a high priest and not an ordinary priest:
    • a par for a chata sin
    • hair stays short, cloths are torn at the bottom
    • cannot become impure to bury a relative
    • must marry a virgin and cannot marry a widow
    • on his death, a unintentional murderer is released from a city of refuge
    • he can serve in the Temple on the day a relative died but cannot eat sanctified food during the day
    • when not an open he has first rights to the sacrifice and his share of sanctified foods
    • he wears eight garments when he is serving
    • he can do the Yom Kipur prayers
    • if he enters the mikdash or eats teruma while tamei, he is exempt from liability
    • these rules also apply to a merubah begadim, unanointed high priest, except for the par as an offering
  • The rabbis discuss which practice take precedence if one commits a sin transgressing a halacha that is of high frequency and also of great holiness


Horayot 11: Lot's Daughters, Leaders

A very brief note on today's daf:

  • Lot's older daughter is rewarded for her eagerness to sleep with her father first: her descendants arrive in HaAretz four generations before those of her sister
  • Lot's older daughter named her son Mo'av, from father; we are to afflict but not wage war on the Moabites
  • Lot's younger daughter named her son Ben Ami, son of the nation; we do not even afflict Amon
  • The rabbis continue to argue about the different sacrifices brought by common people in comparison to a leader: a nasi, a high priest, or a moshuach, an anointed high priest
  • Much attention is given to the timing of one's becoming a nasi or high priest; if one transgressed - whether in eating or another transgression - in the middle of the process, what might be the proper offering to bring?
  • Again the rabbis test the outer edge; the limits of a halacha
  • The rabbis argue about intentionality and transgressions in eating naming the tzeduki and the mumar
A new Mishna clarifies some terms:
  • Nasi: head of the Sanhedrin, leader, prince
    • one for each tribe
    • not submissive to each other
  • Kohen Gadol/Ha Kohen haMoshiach: anointed priest, sometimes transgresses
    • sacrifices on behalf of others who have transgressed
  • Merubeh Bagadim: a high priest who has not been anointed
    • wears the garments of the priest
  • Reish Galuta: the administrative leader (in Bavel or Yerushalayim, et.c)
  • Kohen Sheavar: the stand-in for a High Priest who is sick or ritually impure on Yom Kipur
  • Shemen haMishcha: anointing oil used for Temple items and for the High Priest
    • recipe of boiled roots

Tuesday 10 April 2018

Horayot 10: Leadership, Responsibility, Intent/Benefiting from a Sin/Mitzva

Today's daf moves us directly into lessons about leadership.  Until this point, Masechet Hodayot has prepared us for understanding what it means to be in a position of power.  The King and the Kohen Gadol offer more significant sacrifices than any other.   Power is not about riches alone, but about greater responsibility.

We learn that one who sins with pure intent merits more than one who does a mitzvah with impure intent.  The rabbis go to great lengths to insist that we should strive to do all mitzvot; we should not be discouraged by worrying about our intent.

Rabbis have been assigned to lead when they do not have other sources of income.  But all rabbis who are in positions of great leadership are held to a higher standard.   Leadership roles were characterized as positions of servitude and not honours for rabbis who could not earn a living.  

We are told the story of rabbis who travelled by boat together.  Rabbi Yehoshua packed flour and bread.  Rabban Gamliel brought only bread.  The trip was delayed, and Rabbi Yehoshua shared the extra bread that he made with the flour he had brought.  He explained that he knew that the trip might be delayed due to the star that would appear and mislead the sailors - it appeared every seventy years.  Why did you come on this trip, he was asked.  Knowing that something might happen should not stop us from living.  We should just prepare more carefully.

At the end of our daf, the rabbis discuss those who sin and profit from that action.  One of their case examples is Ya'el.  The rabbis converse about how many times she had intercourse with Sisera in order to eventually save the Jewish people.  The rabbis are hesitant to allow her any benefit - she enjoyed the sin, they say.  Or, perhaps, tzadikim do not enjoy their sins.  Regardless, these sins ultimately benefited the Jewish people.  And we are encouraged to do what we have to do, even if that is sin, for the sake of saving one life.

Monday 9 April 2018

Horayot 9: Transgressions & Sacrifices of Different People; Patterns

Some notes from today's daf:

  • a person who is poor and cannot afford a sheep brings a bird offering
  • a person who cannot afford a bird offering brings a meal offering
  • a king and a kohen gadol are exempt from this because they must be rich
  • a kohen gadol exceeds his brothers in every way (beauty, wealth, etc.)
  • perhaps a kohen gadol exceeds because of his brothers, ie. they give him his wealth
A new Mishna lays out transgressions and their assigned sacrifices:*


Transgression
Person
Sacrifice

One who is punishable by karet when transgressing intentionally

Individual
King
Anointed Kohen
Court
Female lamb/goat 
Male goat
Bull
Bull


Idolatry


Individual
King
Anointed H.P.
Court
Female lamb 
Female lamb
Female Lamb
Bull (olah), Goat (chatas)


The rabbis discuss:
  • those who falsely deny their knowledge of testimony
  • those who are impure in the mikdash
  • those who eat sacrifices
  • those who violate an oath
  • the rabbis look for patterns between those who commit certain offences/ bring specific sacrifices and who is obligated/exempt from those sacrifices
  • the rabbis identify differences between the sacrifices of a king and the sacrifices of a nation

*Chart is adapted from www.DafNotes.com:
http://dafnotes.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/12/Horayos_9-1.pdf

Sunday 8 April 2018

Horayot 8: On the Ten Mitzvot, Belief in G-d, Details of Sacrifice

Who is responsible for mistakes?  As I continue to learn Masechet Hodayot, I become more and more aware of the rabbis' concerns regarding justice.  One should not be punished for a mistake, an accident, in the same way that one is punished for an intentional error.  One person or community should not have to experience a punishment if another person or group erred.  But each specific case is different.  And so Masechet Hodayot is short, but it is filled with these complex examples.

Today we discuss a number of issues related to the priests, mistaken rulings, and how those violations might be punished.  Adultery and idolatry are of particular concern.  The beginning of our daf teaching some important insights of the rabbis regarding the ten mitzvot, commandments, and their reading of people who do not believe in G-d's mitzvot. 

  • making a mistake and ignoring Moshe's mitzvot is punishable by a sin offering
  • what mitzvah is equivalent to all mitzvot? 
  • the rabbis prove this is idolatry in a number of ways
  • or perhaps the first of the ten mitzvot is not a commandment at all; the first is that we cannot worship idols
  • perhaps the first thing written, "I am your G-d" is simply underlies all ten mitzvot
  • Thus it may not be necessary to believe in G-d to observe all of G-d's mitzvot
  • However the rabbis assume that if one does not believe in G-d or if one worships idols, certainly that person would not care about the other mitzvot 
  • the priest atones by sprinkeling the blood of a sin offering
  • the rabbis have to understand why instructions are repetitive: "and the priest shall make atonement for him concerning the sin which he has sinned"
  • if the blood is sprinkled for the sake of atonement and not for the sake of the sinner, the sinner is liable
  • "his sin offering" is interpreted differently than "sin offering" 
  • "his burnt offering" is interpreted differently than "burnt offering"
  • the rabbis argue about possible meanings of "his meal offering" and "his libation"
  • a nazirite's sin offering is different from others
  • a leper's sin offering is different from others
  • eating forbidden fat is punishable by karet
  • eating forbidden fat is an easy mistake to make
  • nazirites and lepers have different access to recourse should they face this transgression
  • different places might have different numbers of idol worshippers
  • we would have to know whether idolaters or non-idolaters are the majority in any place to make any assumptions at all
  • the rabbis go into great detail regarding which sacrifices should be made for which transgressions by which individuals or which groups
The larger ideas are far more intriguing to me than the tiny details that are presented for much of today's daf.  

Saturday 7 April 2018

Horayot 7: The Kohen Gadol and the Public; Intentionality, Transgressions and Offerings

After considering communal sins, the rabbis turn to the Kohen Gadol, the High Priest.  A Kohen Gadol who has been anointed is different from another Kohen Gadol who simply wears the clothing of a Kohen Gadol.  The former has great power; he must bring a bull as his sin offering.  For an individual's transgression, regardless of intentionality, one brings a sin offering.

The Gemara considers three categories of transgressors.  The first is the Kohen Gadol.  The next is the public, or the community.  The third is the individual.   The Gemara discusses the different transgressions that might be committed in each of these parties.  There are similarities and differences among all three possible transgressors.  The rabbis consider intentionality, type of offering, etc.  It is noted that the public is liable if the beit din ruled inadvertently and then the public sinned accidentally.  Similarly, the Kohen Gadol is liable if he himself ruled inadvertently and then sinned accidentally. The rabbis suggest a number of arguments that support the similarity between cases involving the public and cases involving the Kohen Gadol.

The rabbis consider a ruling that is not actually wrong.  A discussion ensues regarding transgressions that might not be as serious as other transgressions based on numerous factors.  It is understood that punishments should differ based on the seriousness of the transgression.  We can now see that the rabbis place significant consideration on context.  Judaism tends to put greater importance on what we do rather than on what we think.  When the rabbis spend this much time deliberating over which punishments are reasonable for accidental, unintentional, or mistaken transgressions, we know that they also valued the importance of our thoughts and feelings - from individuals and communities to High Priests.

Horayot 5: Which Offerings are Made for Their Own Sake?

Our daf reflects on a long conversation about offerings that are given for their own sake.  Which offerings are being discussed?  Might we be able to determine which offerings were referred to in our previous dapim?


The rabbis use the above explanations to explore which offering might have ben mentioned in yesterday's daf.   The chart is based on Steinsalt's explanations of the different offerings.

Wednesday 4 April 2018

Horayot 4: Why the Sanhedrin Might Err; Juding, Mercy/Compassion

We have learned that when the Sanhedrin - the beit din - makes a mistaken ruling and then retracts that ruling, those judges are individually responsible to bring offerings and the community members are exempt.  When would this happen? the Gemara offers a number of possibilities:

  • when the smartest or the leading judge is not present, which would suggest that the judgement was made without his influence and is thus considered to be an intentional error
  • when one judge stood up and warned the others that their ruling was about to be made in error and the other judges overruled him
  • when a member of the court was actually forbidden from sitting on the court - a convert, a mamzer, or a man so old that he cannot have children
Each person who performed the sin was made to bring his/her own offering when the community is seen as 'at fault'.  

Rabbis including Rashi question why a man who cannot have children is not worthy of being on the court.  How could he make the court unworthy of giving a ruling?  Rashi says that he does not know.  However, this 'Rashi' might have been of the 11th century (Germany).  The actual Rashi had ruled in Sanhedrin that an old man would have forgotten what it means to have children.  A judge must be able to find compassion for a defendant just as a father is able to find compassion for his child.

The rabbis take this to mean that judges should always be filled with mercy for all people. It makes no sense that a judge must have children; instead, one who is worthy of giving rulings from the Sanhedrin must be capable of having mercy for the defendants.

Horayot 3: Responsibility: Judges, Communities, etc.

The rabbis continue their conversation about responsibility.  When the beit din errs in its judgement and a person follows the beit din, is he liable?  If he does not follow the ruling of the beit din, is he liable for not following their ruling?  While the rabbis are clear in their exoneration of the individual, they question what should happen when a group of people are involved.  Are none of them liable?  What if the beit din is comprised of dozen of Sages, but only one person disagrees with the ruling.  Is that judge excluded from liability, as well, when his colleagues are held responsible for their error?

What about representation of the Jewish people?  The rabbis wonder about a majority of Jews, and what this might mean.  Perhaps we are only counting Jews in HaAretz, for example.  Further, the rabbis consider what should happen if a majority becomes a minority or if a minority becomes a majority because people leave or die.  The rabbis then discuss communal error.  A bull is the proper offering for a communal error.  Even so, the rabbis decide that all judges must have made the error to warrant a communal offering.   Rabbi Yehoshua argues that all ten judges must have erred if they are claiming personal responsibility (and thus a communal offering, together) for the error.  

A new mishna is introduced.   It outlines what might happen if a person were to carry out the original wishes of the beit din - but does so after their ruling has been retracted.   Perhaps this person should be exempt.  Or perhaps he should be exempt but only if he were travelling and thus not privy to notice about the beit din's new ruling.  The rabbis suggest a number of cases where a person might have been at home (and thus should have known about the retracted ruling).   We are introduced to a number of different errors.  One regards the determination of a woman's ritual status that should have left her untouched.  

So many thoughts are introduced along with the pshat, the basic reading of this text.  How reliant were people on their rabbis to help them function every day?  Were people prone to taking on personal responsibility for things that were not their fault?  Or were people similar to most of us today?  We certainly feel more comfortable assuming communal responsibility than personal responsibility!  And how many rabbis might check a woman's bedikah cloth to determine her status?!

Monday 2 April 2018

Horayot 2: Offerings Made in Error

We begin Masechet Hodayot, rulings, with a foundational mishna.  It teaches about incidences when offerings are slaughtered as instructed by the beit din but the beit din is in error. Perhaps the offerer did not hold the requisite intention.  Perhaps the offerer misspoke, misrepresented or misunderstood the beit din.  All of the offerings mentioned are punishable by karet: sin offerings, guilt offerings, and the Pascal offering.  The offerer  is not obligated to bring another offering as atonement.  

The rabbis then argue about the beit din.  Where might the great rabbis go wrong?  Might it be the timing involved in the Pascal offering?  Did they forget to say a specific pronouncement required to announce their ruling?  What is the beit din required to say in their rulings?  The rabbis agree with Rav Dimi: they must say "you are permitted to do" aloud.  Is "you are permitted" enough?  The rabbis debate this and similar ideas.  They are determined to understand why certain words are included in this mishna.  Further, they wonder why the particular cases included in this mishna were chosen.  

Rabbi Yehuda speaks in the name of Shmuel.  He explains that a mishna that exempts someone who follows the erroneous direction of the beit din are in line with his own opinion.  The Sages maintain that someone who follows an misguided ruling of the beit din is obligated to bring an offering.  Baraitot are introduced to further elucidate this point.

Sunday 1 April 2018

Avodah Zara 76: Kashering Used Vessels

This last daf of Masechet Avodah Zara begins by concluding the rabbis' discussion regarding kashering vessels that belonged to Gentiles.  The rabbis suggest that the longer that a liquid is held in a vessel, the more that it is absorbed into the vessel.

The Gemara moves on, wondering whether a Gentile's roasting spit can be kashered using immersion in hot water.  Do holy vessels absorb more permitted tastes?  Or more forbidden tastes?  Must they be rinsed and scoured?  How long does the smell of past  foods last?  Do those vessels emit past aromas?

We then learn about methods of kashering.  These method are still used today:

  • Rav Mani: heat until the surface peels off
  • a small pot is kashered by being place in a larger pot in boiling water
  • a large pot is filled with water and boiled
  • Drops might splash onto the top of the brim
  • a knife is kashered by rubbing it on a sharpening stone
  • A knife can also be kashered by put in and out of the ground ten times
  • A knife without crevices can be kashered in this way
  • if the knife has crevices, it must be kashered in this way
  • when a knife is inserted into the ground for kashering, it must be otherwise unused 
Our daf ends noting that slaves were offered to Bati and and Yehuda.  One accepted this 'gift' and the other did not.