Bava Batra 49: A Woman's Right to Void a Sale of Property

The rabbis reaffirm that written documents are valued over the spoken word: a document can weaken the spoken word, but the spoken word cannot weaken a document.  If a person signs a moda’a, a document of trust, thinking that it was a promissory note, they are not deemed credible because signing inappropriately is bearing false testimony.  In fact, s/he is held liable for causing any financial loss that resulted from that testimony.  To admit that one has done this is self-incriminating.

Our Mishna had taught that men are not permitted to have chazaka over their wives’ properties; neither is a wife able to establish chazaka over her husband’s property.  The Gemara suggests that this is obvious.  He is permitted to benefit from the profits of her property while the are married but has no claim on the land itself.  But the rabbis teach this because he might have written that he has no legal rights to her property.   He is not to assume that this does not prove that he owns the land, even if she permits him to benefit from use of her property.  One who states that they have no rights to property has no legal standing.  But was the husband’s promise made when they were betrothed but not married?  He could affect his rights after they are married. 

The Gemara turns to the issue of inheritance.  Can one predetermine that s/he will not receive an inheritance that should come in the future?   The rabbis agree that one can prevent possession of property that is not yet his/hers in accordance with Rava.  Rava states that one can refuse something that was intended to benefit him/her.

The example provided is when a woman tells her husband that she will not be sustained by him and that she will keep the profits from her own work.  Similarly, a husband can deny his rights to the profits from his wife’s property.  In any case, he does not establish chazaka regarding presumptive ownership of his wife’s property. 

What if a man provides proof that his wife agreed to sell him her property?   She might step forward and say, “I did it, but I did it only to please my husband and not because I wished to do so.”  This would be similar to a situation that was discussed in Masechet Gittin (55) where a person might buy a husband’s land and the wife purchases the land back with payment of her ketubah.  If he purchased the land back again intending to use it after the death of her husband or their divorce, his purchase is void.   Again, the wife could say that she signed a document validating the sale, but only to please her husband. 

Our daf ends with a condition: there are only three types of fields that are affected by this halacha.  One is a field that the husband wrote about in her ketubah stating that it would serve as payment of her marriage contract.  Another is a field that was specified in the same way but in front of witnesses rather than in her ketubah.  Finally, one is a field that she brought with her into the marriage as guaranteed property.  For any of these properties, a woman can say that she agreed to their sale only in order to please her husband.  The purchases will be considered void.