Gittin 83: Conditional Gittin and True Severance

The rabbis want to understand the limitations of conditional gittin.  If a husband creates a condition that is time-limited, the get can be valid as long as the wife meets that condition.  But if a husband creates a condition that is ongoing, the get is not valid.  One example is the husband who gives his wife the get as long as she does not marry a particular man.  Even if the wife were to acquiesce with that condition, she could remarry, have children, get divorced, and then marry the man who was forbidden to her.  This would retroactively invalidate her first divorce and the sanctity of her second marriage.  Her children would be called mamzerim and she would not be permitted to remain married to her third husband.  To avoid such situations, the rabbis are careful regarding conditional gittin.

One of the conversations that the rabbis highlight regards the structure of their argument.  We learn that Rabbi Eliezer wrote a baraita on this topic which was accepted and then he died.  After he died a number of rabbis debated the validity of his baraita.  Rabbi Yehuda argues that one does not refute the opinion of a lion after its death.  The rabbis discuss whether or not Rabbi Eliezer was a lion, why it might be offensive to refute one's opinion after his death, and whether or not they are actually refuting his opinion after his death.

To illustrate their points further, the rabbis speak about limitations regarding marriage into the priesthood.  By the end of today's daf the rabbis are pointedly discussing the notion of severance.  A divorce is meant to sever the bond between husband and wife so completely that a wife is free to marry whomever she wishes.  A get that fails to sever the bond between husband and wife is not a valid get.  Without that severance, the rabbis could envision a crumbling societal structure where women were breaking halacha and many children were mamzerim.  This would have been an unacceptable outcome of poorly designed halacha.