Ketubot 13: Rabbi Yahoshua does not conduct his life based on her words

Today's daf introduces two Mishnayot with describing three distinct cases.  In each of these cases, the wife is being accused of something; she claims her innocence.  Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer agree that she is credible.  However, Rabbi Yahoshua says that we do not conduct our lives based upon her mouth.  Rather, she retains her presumptive status until she can provide proof of her claim.

Where does Rabbi Yahoshua's repeated comment come from?  It seems to be misogynistic.  Women's words do not help us create our rulings.  A note in Steinsaltz helped me to understand perhaps another level of meaning.  Formal principles and informal guidelines determined how the rabbis argues and decided upon halachot.  One person is almost never permitted to act as a witness.  

Just to add another layer to that point, a woman is not permitted to be a legal witness as she does not truly have the status of person in Talmudic times.  She is the acquisition of her father or the acquisition of her husband.  She is to be provided for and protected.  But if she crosses certain lines, she is on her own.

The first Mishna is concerned with the case of a woman who is accused of having a petach petuach.  She claims that this is true but that she was damaged by wood (a euphemism for having broken one's hymen accidentally with something other than flesh).  Rabbi Yahoshua claims that she maintains her preemptive status of having been "trampled by a man".  The Gemara considers what her ketubah should be worth in these different circumstances.  The rabbis question why she did not tell him in advance of their marriage that she had been 'damaged'.  Also, the rabbis consider whether or not her claim is supported by a migo, a claim that brings her less fortune than an alternative claim.
 The second Mishna offers two cases for examination.  The first tells of a woman who is seen speaking with an unknown man.  When asked, she states his name and that he is a priest.  While Rabbi Eliezer and Rabban Gamliel believe her, Rabbi Yochanan reminds the rabbis not to use the words of her mouth to conduct their lives.  He says that she retains the preemptive status of one who has had intercourse with a Gibeonite or a mamzer until she brings proof of her claim.  

The second case tells of a pregnant woman who is asked about the father of the fetus.  If she states his name and that he is a priest, Rabbi Eliezer and Rabban Gamliel believe her.  Rabbi Yochanan does not wish for his life to be conducted by the words of her mouth.  He says that she retains the preemptive status of a woman who conceived with a Gibeonite or a mamzer.The Gemara discusses this mishna at length.  First, the rabbis note that she was speaking with a man.  How does this constitute intercourse?  The Gemara refers to the euphemism stated in Proverbs 30:20:  She eats and wipes her mouth and says, "I have done no wickedness".  

The rabbis then wonder why these two cases are stated together; what is the novelty that suggests the need for two different cases?  Their answers are based upon the status of the child once it is born.  It might retain the status of its mother; its entire life might be affected by this ruling.  The rabbis consider these women's statements and the possible consequences that they face.  

• They discuss appropriate punishments for seclusion: usually, a man and woman are both flogged for seclusion.  The woman is not barred from her husband's home, however. Why is this case different? 

• Next, the rabbis remind us that these women are claiming that the men in question were priests.  If they were living in a city where lineage was clear, shouldn't it be easy to believe her claim?  

• Further on, the rabbis look at what difference it might make if the woman had been taken captive.  Looking at the halachot regarding captivity, the rabbis note assumptions that are made regarding captors' status and sexual behaviour.  

• They end the daf with questions about the status of the child in this situation.  Is s/he a mamzer? A shtuki, one whose father is unknown? How might this knowledge change rabbis' understanding about the legal processes facing these women?

It is clear that the words of women are not generally trusted by the rabbis.  Was this because of women's status at the time, as acquisitions rather than as those with the full rights of men?  Was this because women had done things that led the rabbis to mistrust them?  Was this a simple lack of communication between women and men?  We continue to face legal situations where voices are not heard or believed; however, these voices are those of both women and men.