Wednesday 29 May 2013

Eiruvin 82a,b

We begin with a discussion of whether or not amora'im can disagree with each other (yes) and whether an amora can dispute a tanna (no).  Quickly the rabbis move into a fascinating conversation regarding who is disqualified from giving testimony.  We learn that moneylenders for interest, pigeon-racers for money, traders during the Sabbatical year, and gamblers with no other occupation (that last qualification is in dispute) may not testify.  

The Gemara explains that gamblers are seen as robbers, as they make bets, which means that they accept money that has not been fully handed over.  Rabbi Yehuda believes that a gambler with another occupation is not a robber as he is participating in the development of the world.  So Rabbi Yehuda does not agree that accepting money in that dubious situation demonstrates that a person is not otherwise trustworthy.

As a therapist who has worked in the area of substance abuse, this analysis is very interesting to me.  In the Talmud, the question of gambling is not a moral question based on the idea that someone lacks the will to meet a "thou shalt not gamble" rule.  Instead, gambling is a moral question based on accepting money that has not been sincerely and fully given.  That idea might be helpful for people struggling with addiction problems.  It removes the "you are a bad person" shaming.  Rather, "that person is vulnerable and I cannot take his/her money" is the operational concept.

What an amazing play on the concept of intention and consent!  If we use this concept when thinking of the crime of sexual assault, for example, a man who has assaulted a woman has not received her consent, and thus he has committed the crimes of assault AND of robbery - he has taken something that was not offered.

The rabbis wonder about whether a young child must have his/her own eiruv, or whether s/he is covered by the eiruv of his/her mother or father.  They decide on the age of maturity. Is it at four? or five? or six?  up to six, or including six? is it when s/he can wipe him/herself after defecating?  is it when s/he does not call out when awakening, "Mother, Mother..." for an extended period of time?

This conversation suggests that children are usually with their mothers up to age six in the times of the Talmud.  What did these children use to wipe themselves?  Did mothers run to their children when the children awoke?  Did fathers ever do that work of parenting?  Perhaps Rav Asi, who maintained that a six year-old child should be covered by his/her mother's eiruv, had a needier child at home at the time of the debate.  

We move into Perek 8, and the rabbis continue a discussion of agency: who is responsible for whom when setting the eiruv? An interesting conversation regarding the power of the 'master' of the home ensues.  It is clear that the men carry most of the power in ancient Jewish life, but others are allowed - in fact, required - to act on their own behalf in certain situations.  In modern times in North America, our rules feel obvious - agency is most often based on the ability to comprehend the implications of an action and to consent to that action.  However, perhaps not so obvious, after all - children are under the will of their parents until age 16; children cannot vote; immigrants and visitors have fewer rights/less agency than others in our society.

A new Mishna brings us back to the question of how much food is required to establish an eiruv.  The measurements and currency discussed: a sela, a se'a, a dinar, a pundeyon, a kav, a ma'a -- I have very little concept of what these represent.  So following the conversation is tough - except for understanding that some believe that 1/4 of a loaf is a meal, and others disagree.  Regardless of the size of the loaf, this is helpful.  We learn that people often ate only two meals on weekdays.  Another reason to look forward to Shabbat!

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