Tuesday 7 May 2013

Eiruvin 60a, b

Today's daf begins with rules regarding ladders and balconies:

  • what counts as an entrance? 
  • when is there a partition?  
  • how might that affect the establishment of an eiruv? 


moves to rules regarding small and large cities:

  • when do we exclude parts of a city from the eiruv?


and ends with discussion about the meaning of a new Mishna:

  • where is one positioned when the eiruv is set by another person?
  • how far can one be from one's residence when establishing an eiruv?
  • when and how far can we walk through large/small cities to establish an eiruv?


Through all of that discussion I found myself struggling to focus my attention.  When I do not fully grasp the concepts at hand, for example, the exclusion of part of a city when creating an eiruv, I find it difficult to follow the larger argument.  And so much of what I read in Talmud is learned through sheer determination (and no small degree of frustration).

Two points did stand out for me today.

First, in daf 60a, Abaye calls out Rav Yosef.  He asks whether Rabbi Yitzchak's ruling  - which was overruled - was based on logic or tradition.  Rav Yosef suggests that it does not matter, for we do not use Rabbi Yitzchak's ruling as halacha.  Abaye chides his colleague: "When learning Talmud, is it the same as learning a song?" We learn from this expression that we do not simply memorize the words of Talmud; we must strive to understand the reasoning behind the words.

This statement speaks to much of what draws me to Talmudic study: there is a constant, unending search for analysis that far surpasses the search for halacha.  Why did the rabbi suggest this interpretation?  Does it make sense in all circumstances? Why and why not?  What else do we know about that rabbi that can help us understand his ruling?  This deep level of questioning appeals to me immensely.

Second, in daf 60b, Rabbi Idi tells us that previous words (regarding measuring only to the middle of a city) are "nothing more than words of prophecy".  Rava then counters with further prooftexts for the statement at hand.  We learn in Steinsaltz's side note that Tosafot discuss the meaning of this expression at greater length.  Any statement decreed without reasoning attached to it can be thought of as prophecy.  The Sages are well aware that they are not Prophets.  As Sages, they must support all interpretations with text-based proofs.

In today's world of false prophets; talking heads on "news" programs and self-help gurus, I recognize that these "experts" often regurgitate the ideas of others in a new, shiny package without any credit given to others.  Sometimes I think that I should make a more decent living by fashioning myself as an "expert" in my professional field: write a book, go on the lecture circuit, lead training seminars.  But I believe that my knowledge is based upon the knowledge of others.  I might repackage that information, but none of my knowledge is truly 'mine' -- other than the knowledge based solely on my personal emotional experience.   

I simply love the humility of the rabbis -- or at least, the humility encouraged through the tradition of rabbinical discourse. These men certainly faced the challenges that accompany tremendous ego strength.  They were sought out as experts and judges and advisors.  But they were people, and they were encouraged to see themselves as fallible.  The rabbis, even with the power that they wielded (and sometimes mismanaged),  cited sources and ascribed credit to others.  We have much to learn from that process. 

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